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NOT LIKE IT WAS IN THE OLD DAYS: IS THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT CHANGING THE FACE OF
SPORTS AS WE KNOW IT?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")1 was enacted as
"comprehensive legislation to ban discrimination against persons
with disabilities." 2 Upon the signing of the ADA, President George
H. W. Bush made a statement rejecting claims that the ADA would
cause "an explosion of litigation."3 To the contrary, there has been
a significant amount of litigation concerning the potential reach of
the ADA. 4 In the sports arena, athletes have sought ADA protec-
tion for a variety of disabilities recognized under the Act, including
learning disabilities, drug and alcohol use, infection with HIV, and
mobility and health impairments. 5
In the notable case PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,6 a professional
golfer, Casey Martin, was granted relief under the ADA. 7 Martin
sued PGA Tour, Inc. after it denied Martin's request to use a golf
cart in the third round of one of its qualifying events. 8 The Su-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
2. Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1165 (July 30, 1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601 [hereinafter President's Statement]. President Bush
stated that the ADA "promises to open up all aspects of American life to individu-
als with disabilities - employment opportunities, government services, public ac-
commodations, transportation, and telecommunications." Id.
3. See id. President Bush explained, "fears that the ADA... will lead to an
explosion of litigation are misplaced." Id.
4. SeeJOHN W. PARRY, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILI-
TIES ACT, at v (Mara L. Flynn ed., 2d ed. 1997) (describing "explosion" of ADA
litigation specifically concerning mental disabilities since 1994). For a discussion
of cases concerning the scope of the ADA, see infra notes 49-127 and accompany-
ing text.
5. See Laura F. Rothstein, Don't Roll in My Parade: The Impact of Sports and En-
tertainment Cases on Public Awareness and Understanding of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 19 REv. LITIG. 399, 404-14 (2000) (noting fair amount of litigation
regarding discrimination in sports and entertainment). For a discussion of actions
brought by athletes with disabilities, see infra notes 49-127 and accompanying text.
6. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
7. See id. at 690 (discussing Martin's right to use golf cart in tournaments).
8. See id. at 668-69. Martin suffers from a degenerative circulatory disorder,
Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, which causes him severe pain in his right leg
when walking. See id. at 668. As a result, walking an eighteen-hole golf course puts
Martin at great risk of hemorrhaging, developing blood clots and fracturing his
tibia. See id. The progression of Martin's disease prevented him from walking an
(153)
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preme Court determined that golfers fell within the ambit of ADA
protection. 9 The Court further held that allowing Martin to use a
golf cart would not "fundamentally alter the nature" of the PGA
Tour's Q-school and tournaments.' 0 In a lengthy dissent, Justice
Scalia opined that the majority's individualized inquiry would result
in a multitude of litigation. 1 He argued that the Court used the
expansive purposes of the ADA to increase vastly and unjustly the
coverage of Title 111.12 Scalia also described the Court's literal read-
ing of the statute as distorted.' 3
Since the Martin decision, athletes have filed a handful of ADA
suits that have been decided at the district and appellate court
levels.' 4 Additionally, Terry Glenn, former wide receiver for the
New England Patriots, filed suit under the ADA against the Na-
tional Football League ("NFL"), alleging discrimination in its sub-
stance abuse policy.' 5 Are Justice Scalia's predictions being
realized? Do these cases exemplify the inevitable inundation of liti-
gation, resulting in ubiquitous change to sports rules?
entire eighteen-hole golf course by the end of his college career at Stanford Uni-
versity. See id. For a further discussion of Martin, see infra notes 79-102 and accom-
panying text.
9. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 680-81. Golfers participating in the PGA Tour's Q-
school and tournaments were found to be "clients or customers" within the mean-
ing of the ADA. See id. at 680. Q-school is a three-stage qualifying tournament for
the PGA Tour or the Nike Tour. See id. at 665. The Court stated that although the
PGA Tour "identifies one set of clients or customers that it serves (spectators at
tournaments)," it is not precluded "from having another set (players in tourna-
ments) against whom it may not discriminate." Id. at 680.
10. See id. at 683 ("We are not persuaded that a waiver of the walking rule for
Martin would work a fundamental alteration.").
11. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting majority guaran-
tees future cases must be decided on individualized factual findings). For a fur-
ther discussion of Justice Scalia's criticism of the majority's approach, see infra
notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
12. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. See id. at 691. Justice Scalia stated, "[t]he judgment distorts the text of
Title III, the structure of the ADA, and common sense." Id. Justice Scalia later
analogized the majority's opinion to Alice in Wonderland and AnimalFarm. See id. at
705. Scalia stated that complaints about the Martin decision should be aimed at
the majority and:
[I]ts Alice in Wonderland determination that there are such things as
judicially determinable "essential" and "nonessential" rules of a made-up
game; and its Animal Farm determination that fairness and the ADA
mean that everyone gets to play by individualized rules which will assure
that no one's lack of ability . . . will be a handicap.
Id.
14. For a further discussion of cases decided since Martin, see infra notes 103-
27 and accompanying text.
15. See Nick Cafardo, Glenn Sues NFL, Charging Discrimination, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 31, 2002, at El1. For a further discussion of Terry Glenn's suit against the
NFL, see infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 10: p. 153
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ADA's IMPACT ON SPORTS
This Comment begins with a basic overview of the ADA and
the purposes behind its adoption. 16 Part II discusses several cases
that laid the foundation for Martin.1 7 An explanation of the Martin
case then follows, including its analysis and application of the
ADA.18 A discussion of decisions released since Martin concludes
Part 11.19 Finally, Parts III and IV analyze the potential effects of the
Martin decision to increase litigation by athletes with disabilities
under the ADA and to change the way sports are played in the
United States.20
II. BACKGROUND
A. The ADA: Its Provisions and Application
1. Purpose
The purpose of the ADA was to combat discriminatory treat-
ment of disabled individuals. 21 Congress intended to reverse the
historical segregation and isolation of the disabled.22 Additionally,
Congress sought to give disabled Americans full and equal opportu-
16. For an overview of the ADA, see infra notes 21-47 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of opinions issued before the Martin case, see infra notes
48-78 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the Martin decision, see infra notes 79-102 and accom-
panying text.
19. For a discussion of opinions issued after the Martin decision, see infra
notes 103-27 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the potential impact of the Martin decision on future
litigation and on athletic rules, see infra notes 128-78 and accompanying text.
21. See Mary L. Topliff, Annotation, Remedies Available Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (42 U.SC. § 12101 et seq.), 136 A.L.R. FED. 63, 75-76 (1997) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1991)). The purpose of the statute "is to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." Id.; see also H.R. CONE. REP. No. 101-558, at 3 (1990)
(finding that forty-three million disabled individuals encounter discrimination in
private sector).
22. See PARRY, supra note 4, at 2-3 (citing congressional findings of isolated
and segregated disabled individuals having no legal recourse in light of continuing
discrimination). Congress had the following four basic purposes for enacting the
ADA:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimi-
nation of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforc-
ing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with
disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power
to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in or-
der to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by peo-
ple with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
20031
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nities equivalent to their able-bodied counterparts. 23 Underlying
the ADA and other disability discrimination laws is thus a policy to
integrate or "mainstream" individuals with disabilities. 24 "Main-
streaming" connotes that the disabled should be allowed to partici-
pate in programs available to the public.2 5 To achieve these goals,
the ADA provides protection from discrimination in areas of em-
ployment, public services, and public accommodations. 26
2. Definitional Section
A definitional section precedes Title I of the ADA, which de-
fines the term "disability." 27 A "disability" is: "(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the ma-
jor life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impair-
ment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."28
Certain specific conditions are excluded from the ADA's coverage,
such as use of illegal drugs, homosexuality, and transvestism. 29
23. See Christopher M. Parent, Martin v. PGA Tour: A Misapplication of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 J. LEGIS. 123, 127 (2000) (noting legislators
planned to achieve equal opportunity for disabled by "invok[ing] the sweep
of congressional authority" (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (b) (4))).
24. See Rothstein, supra note 5, at 404 (noting issue of "mainstreaming" often
arises in cases under ADA).
25. See id. In a footnote, Rothstein noted that the ADA does not explicitly
state "mainstreaming" as a purpose. See id. This purpose may be inferred from
Congress's statements that the ADA was meant to eliminate segregation of disabled
individuals from society. See id. at 404 n.22.
26. See Topliff, supra note 21, at 76 (referencing three different titles under
ADA that cover these three areas). Discrimination in employment is prohibited in
Title 1, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994); public service is addressed in Title II, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); and public accommodations and
services are covered in Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
See id.; see alsoJonathan R. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Its Application
to High School, Collegiate and Professional Athletics, 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 243, 245
(1999) (stating disabled athletes can bring suit under Titles I, II, or III).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994); see also Parent, supra note 23, at 128 (stating
definitional section is most important and least controversial section of ADA).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Karl A. Menninger II, Employment Discrimination on
the Basis of Mental Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 AM. JUR. 3D
Proof of Facts 1, 11-12 (Mary G. Leary ed., 1998) (stating Congress decided not to
list conditions that would qualify as disabilities). "Congress ... chose to focus on
the effects of the condition, regardless of its name. In addition, the broad defini-
tion does not preclude conditions that may be discovered in the future." Id. at 12;
see also Cook, supra note 26, at 245 (mentioning athlete must demonstrate he or
she falls under ADA definition of "disabled" before athlete may bring suit).
29. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12211 (1994); see also Menninger, supra note 28, at 12
(discussing conditions that are excluded from scope of ADA coverage). The ADA
excludes sexual disorders, including "transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, ex-
hibitionism, voyeurism [and] gender identity disorders not resulting from physical
impairments." 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (b) (1). The ADA also excludes "compulsive gam-
[Vol. 10: p. 153
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Once an athlete determines that he or she fulfills one of these
criteria for being disabled, he or she must decide under which of
the ADA's titles to bring suit.3 0 A disabled athlete may bring a
claim under Titles I, II, or III, although a majority of these claims
are brought under Titles II and III.3 1 While the definitions of the
language used in the ADA have been the subject of much litigation,
this Comment provides only a brief overview of the functions of
three of the five titles of the ADA.
3. Title I. Employment
Title I proscribes discriminating against "a qualified individual
with a disability" on the basis of that person's disability in any aspect
of employment.3 2 A "qualified individual with a disability" is de-
fined as someone able to perform the essential functions of a posi-
tion, whether or not provided a reasonable accommodation.
33
Title I applies to all employers with fifteen or more employees, in-
cluding state and local government entities and labor organiza-
tions. 3 4  A covered employer must make reasonable
accommodations for the limitations of an otherwise qualified indi-
vidual, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship. 35
bling, kleptomania, pyromania, and substance abuse disorders resulting from cur-
rent illegal use of drugs." Id. § 12211 (b) (2); see also Menninger, supra note 28, at
15 (discussing scope of ADA coverage).
30. See Cook, supra note 26, at 245 (discussing how drafters created distinct
titles to combat discrimination in specific areas).
31. See id. (noting Titles II and III together "encompass nearly every public
and private entity in the country"). For a discussion of the coverage of each re-
spective title, see supra note 26.
32. See PARRY, supra note 4, at 3 (noting different areas of employment cov-
ered under ADA); see also DEBORAH ZUCKERMAN ET AL., THE ADA ANDu PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS: A RESOURCE MANUAL FOR EMPLOYERS 16 (1993). This title covers
all areas of employment including: "recruitment, application and interview proce-
dures, medical examinations; hiring, training, promotion, transfer; assignments,
classifications, position descriptions; compensation, leave, other benefits; layoff, re-
call, discharge; and employer-sponsored programs, including social and recrea-
tional activities." Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also PARRY, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing defi-
nition of disabled individual covered under Title I).
34. See Menninger, supra note 28, at 20 (noting further that ADA prohibits
discrimination in all aspects of employment); see also PARRY, supra note 4, at 3 (ad-
ding that both state and local governments are covered under Title II, regardless
of employer's size).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A) (1994). An employer must make "reason-
able accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or an employee." Id.; see
also PARRY, supra note 4, at 3 (listing seven categories of prohibited discrimination
enumerated in Title I).
2003]
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4. Title II: Public Service
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public entities
in the distribution of beneficial services, programs, or activities of a
public entity based on an individual's disability. 6 A public entity is
defined as "any State or local government; any department, agency,
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States
or local government."37 To determine if an entity falls under the
ADA definition of a public entity, courts focus on the "amount of
authority delegated to the entity from the state."38 Similar to Title
I, to make a claim under Title II, a person must fall under the defi-
nition of a "qualified individual." 39 This is defined as a person who
meets essential eligibility requirements for a particular public ser-
vice, with or without reasonable accommodations. 40
5. Title III: Public Accommodations and Privately-Operated Services
Congress promulgated Title III to prevent discrimination "on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. ' 41 Title
III is applicable to essentially any private entity that engages in com-
merce between two states, or between a state and a foreign nation.42
Although Title III does not provide a definition of "public accom-
modation," it contains a non-exhaustive list of potential "public ac-
commodations" to give guidance to private entities in interpreting
this language. 43 Some of the entities covered are "restaurants, stadi-
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994); see also PARRv, supra note 4, at 4 (referencing
Subtitle A of Title II, sections 201-05).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1994); see also Parent, supra note 23, at 131 (discussing
Title II of ADA).
38. Cook, supra note 26, at 247 (citing Rhodes v. Ohio Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 939
F. Supp. 584, 591 (N.D. Ohio 1996)). Courts also consider "whether athletic asso-
ciation members are public schools, whether members can use public facilities,
and whether an athletic association can sanction public schools for violations of its
rules." Id. at 247-48 (noting athletic associations and state universities typically
qualify as "public entities" under Title II).
39. See id. at 247 (discussing qualifying criteria to be covered under Title II of
ADA).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994) (providing general rule of Title III).
42. See PARRY, supra note 4, at 5 (discussing applicability of Title III); see also
Parent, supra note 23, at 131 (stating ADA defines private entity as "anything other
than a public entity" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12181(c))).
43. See Cook, supra note 26, at 253 n.93 (stating twelve categories of private
entities are provided in list, including description of fifty examples of physical
structures and facilities); see also Parent, supra note 23, at 131 (avowing main-
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urns, auditoriums, bakeries, laundromats, museums, parks, schools,
gymnasiums and golf courses. ' 44 If an entity is found to provide a
public accommodation, the ADA requires that it make "reasonable
modifications" for those with disabilities, similar to the requirement
under Title 1.45 To avoid liability, an employer must show that it
could not make these modifications without "fundamentally alter-
ing" the nature of the public accommodation. 46 Title III was the
section of the ADA relevant in Martin, in which the Court discussed
in detail the issue of fundamental alterations. 47
B. Cases Arising Under the ADA: Pre-Martin
1. Cases with Successful Plaintiffs
Since the enactment of the ADA in 1990 and before the
landmark case Martin in 2001, there have been many student-ath-
lete eligibility cases that illustrate the ADA's requirement of reason-
streaming effect of breadth of Title III coverage); Rothstein, supra note 5, at 402
(noting several sports and entertainment related activities are directly covered
within twelve categories). "Title III is perhaps the most ambitious section of the
ADA, granting rights to disabled customers who would not otherwise have been
permitted to participate in many of the central activities of mainstream society."
Parent, supra note 23, at 131. "The purpose behind Title III and its attendant
regulations ... is to facilitate the removal of physical, organizational, and attitudi-
nal barriers from places of public accommodation and commercial facilities." Id.
(citing 1 HENRY H. PERRiuTr, JR., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK 246
(3d. ed. 1997)).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7) (1994); see also Parent, supra note 23, at 131 (noting
Congress's attempt to clarify meaning of "public accommodation" by providing
list).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii) (1994). An employer may be required
to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices or procedures to meet this
statutory requirement. See id.; see also PARRY, supra note 4, at 5 (indicating "public
accommodations must provide goods and services in the most integrated setting
appropriate to each individual's needs"). Public accommodations must provide
the opportunity for persons with disabilities to participate in regular programs,
even if the entity offers programs specifically for disabled persons. See id. "A per-
son with a disability must be free to choose which program or activity to participate
in." Id.
46. See Cook, supra note 26, at 253 (noting burden shifts to defendant to es-
tablish that making modification would fundamentally alter nature of accommoda-
tion); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (explicating that entity must show
modification would "fundamentally alter nature of goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages or accommodations" being offered).
47. See Parent, supra note 23, at 131. "Title III is the most pertinent section of
the ADA in terms of the Martin case and the law's application to professional
sports." Id. In Martin, the issue was the application of Title III of the ADA to the
PGA Tour's tournaments and Q-school. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S.
661, 675-76 (2001). For a further discussion of Martin, see infra notes 79-102 and
accompanying text.
2003]
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able accommodations. 48 This Comment discusses two such cases,
which represent challenges to an age limit on eligibility and to the
eight-semester rule.
In Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n,49 a
nineteen-year-old high school student with Down Syndrome chal-
lenged the Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference
("CIAC") over its eligibility rule prohibiting a student-athlete from
competing in high school sports unless his or her nineteenth birth-
day was on or after September 1st.50 Dennin was a member of the
swim team at Trumbull High School, a CIAC school. 51 Dennin was
in special education classes and spent four, rather than the stan-
dard three, years in middle school. 52 He therefore turned nineteen
before September 1st of the 1995 to 1996 school year and conse-
quently was denied eligibility.53 Dennin requested a waiver of the
CIAC age eligibility rule, but was denied.54 He was allowed to swim
with his team at all regular season meets, but only as a non-scoring
swimmer. 55
48. See Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 181 F.3d 840, 848 (7th
Cir. 1999) (holding it is possible to show discrimination on basis of disability by
refusal to make reasonable accommodation); Frye v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, No. 95-1266, 1997 WL 441805, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 1997) (holding plain-
tiff had no probability of success on merits of ADA claim); McPherson v. Mich.
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 459-63 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding athletic
association's eight-semester rule did not violate ADA); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1036-37 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding waiver of age re-
quirement not reasonable modification under Title II); Bingham v. Or. Sch. Activi-
ties Ass'n, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1205-06 (D. Or. 1999) (holding waiver of eight-
semester rule was reasonable accommodation for learning disability), vacated as
moot, No. 99-35366, 2001 WL 1217701 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2001); Dennin v. Conn.
Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663, 668-70 (D. Conn.
1996) (holding denial of waiver violated ADA), vacated as moot, appeal dismissed, 94
F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996);Johnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579,
582 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding age requirement did not fundamentally alter nature
of program, so waiver amounted to reasonable accommodation), vacated as moot,
102 F.3d 1172 (l1th Cir. 1997).
49. 913 F. Supp. at 663 (D. Conn. 1996).
50. See id. at 666 (discussing several purposes behind eligibility rule as an-
nounced by CIAC).
51. See id. (recognizing that despite being slow, Dennin's relay team some-
times scored points for team).
52. See id. (noting Dennin was eligible for special education pursuant to Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")).
53. See id. The court found that Dennin was aware of his ineligibility, which
affected his "self-esteem ... and willingness to function in a community, most of
whose members are not afflicted with his limitations." Id.
54. See Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at 666.
55. See id. (noting Dennin and his relay team could not earn points for team
at swim meets).
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Dennin filed his claim under Tides II and III of the ADA.56
The district court held that the denial of the waiver by the CIAC
violated the ADA because Dennin was a "qualified individual with a
disability. '57 This meant that he could compete in swim meets with
a reasonable accommodation, namely the waiver of the eligibility
rule.58 Hence, the court held that waiver of the eligibility rule con-
stituted a reasonable accommodation, allowing Dennin to compete
as a scoring swimmer. 59
In another case pre-dating Martin, Washington v. Indiana High
School Athletic Ass'n,6° a student-athlete challenged the eight-semes-
ter rule, which limited athletic eligibility to the first eight semesters
after the student began the ninth grade.61 Washington, a student
basketball player, was held back in the eighth grade and eventually
56. See id. at 670. Dennin also instituted suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976). See id. at 667. The failure to waive the eligibility requirement
was found to violate the Rehabilitation Act as well as the ADA. See id. at 671.
57. See id. at 670-71. The court stated that because Dennin was found to fall
within the "otherwise qualified" definition of the Rehabilitation Act, he satisfied
the element of "qualified individual with a disability" under Title II of the ADA. See
id. at 671. This finding also satisfied the requirement under Title III that Dennin
must have been denied the opportunity to participate solely because of his disabil-
ity. See id. But cf Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1033
(6th Cir. 1995) (holding age limit for eligibility does not exclude students solely
based on disability). See generally Adam A. Milani, Can I Play?: The Dilemma of the
Disabled Athlete in Interscholastic Sports, 49 ALA. L. REv. 817, 859 (1998) (noting split
in case law on whether neutral age limit rules can be held discriminatory). "This
second line of cases [holding that neutral rules are discriminatory towards student-
athletes], best exemplified by Dennin, is better reasoned and more in line with the
purposes of the ADA .... Id. "[The ADA] prohibit[s] rules which screen out or
'tend to screen out' persons with disabilities." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(A)
(1994)).
58. See Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at 670; see also Cook, supra note 26, at 251 (noting
Dennin holding that waiver of age requirement would not undermine any of pur-
poses of association's rules).
59. See Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at 671. The court required waiver of the rule for
Dennin to allow him to compete and score points for his team during the athletic
season. See id.; see also Bingham v. Or. Sch. Activities Ass'n, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1189,
1205-06 (D. Or. 1999) (holding waiver of eight-semester rule was reasonable ac-
commodation for learning disability), vacated as moot, No. 99-35366, 2001 WL
1217701 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2001);Johnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F.
Supp. 579, 586 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding age-requirement did not fundamentally
alter nature of program, so waiver was reasonable accommodation), vacated as
moot, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997); Michael G. Hypes et al., Athletic Eligibility and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 73J. PHYsicAL EDUC., RECREATION & DANCE 11, 11-
14 (2002). For a further discussion of the eight-semester rule, see infra note 61
and accompanying text.
60. 181 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 1999).
61. See id. at 842 (indicating eight-semester rule implemented to promote aca-
demics over athletics).
2003]
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dropped out of school at the beginning of the eleventh grade. 62 He
re-entered school at a different high school, Central Catholic, and
began playing basketball for the school. 63 It was during his first
year at this high school that he was diagnosed as learning dis-
abled.64 A year and a half after Washington entered Central Catho-
lic, his eligibility to play basketball lapsed because he had started
the ninth grade eight-semesters before. 65 Central Catholic applied
to the Indiana High School Athletic Association ("IHSAA") for a
waiver of the rule on behalf of Washington, but IHSAA denied both
the waiver and the appeal. 66 Washington subsequently sued IHSAA
under Title II of the ADA. 67
The Seventh Circuit found that waiver of the eight-semester
rule for Washington would not fundamentally alter the rule.68 Per-
mitting Washington to count only those semesters in which he was
enrolled in school towards his eligibility would not frustrate the
62. See id. Washington constantly received failing grades and was told by a
school counselor to drop out. See id. He decided to re-enter school at Central
Catholic High School after playing in a three-on-three basketball tournament
sponsored by the school. See id.
63. See id. The coach of the Central Catholic basketball team convinced
Washington to return to high school. See id.
64. See id. Washington had been tested previously for a learning disability but
was found not to have one. See id.
65. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 842.
66. See id. at 84243 (discussing Central Catholic's request inter alia that asso-
ciation not consider semesters Washington was absent from school). The Seventh
Circuit noted that the IHSAA had granted waivers for physical injuries in the past,
which was another of the stated reasons for a waiver in Central Catholic's request.
See id. at 843.
67. See id. at 843.
68. See id. at 852 (affirming district court's findings). The Seventh Circuit
noted that the athletic association had granted waivers of the eight-semester rule
in the past, thereby showing that a waiver in this situation would not fundamentally
alter the rule. See id.
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rule's purposes. 69 Therefore, the waiver was held to be a reasona-
ble accommodation.
7 0
2. Cases with Unsuccessful Plaintiffs
Conversely, there have been cases predating Martin in which
plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in claims brought under the ADA.
One such case is Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n,71 in
which the Sixth Circuit rejected a challenge to an age limit on ath-
letic eligibility by two learning disabled students.7 2 Both students
had fallen behind the school grade for most students of their age
group because of their learning disabilities. 73 The Michigan High
School Athletic Association ("MHSAA") imposed an age limit on
athletic eligibility, prohibiting students from competing if they
turned nineteen before September 1st of the school year during
which they sought eligibility.74 The MHSAA's rules did not permit
waiver of this age limit, and as a result, both students sued under
the ADA. 75 The Sixth Circuit found that the MHSAA was not ex-
69. See id. The Seventh Circuit explained that under Indiana's eight-semester
rule, "the eligibility clock therefore continues to tick when a student drops out of
school." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The court said: "Mr. Washington re-
quested only that the semesters that he was absent from school because of his
disability not count toward his eight semesters of eligibility; he did not ask that the
IHSAA be prohibited from allowing the eligibility clock to run while he was en-
rolled." Id. But see Bingham v. Or. Sch. Activities Ass'n, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1191
(D. Or. 1999) (discussing eight-semester rule at issue in case), vacated as moot, No.
99-35366, 2001 WL 1217701 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2001). In Bingham, the Oregon
School Activities Association had a similar eight-semester rule to that in Washing-
ton, with athletic eligibility limited to eight consecutive semesters while enrolled in
high school. See id. This rule applied regardless of whether the student athlete
participated in sports during each of the eight semesters. See id. The court held
that waiving the eight-semester rule was a reasonable modification in light of Bing-
ham's learning disability. See id. at 1205. Bingham had only participated in athlet-
ics for six of the eight semesters enrolled in school. See id. at 1191.
70. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 852; see also Hypes, supra note 59, at 14. "The
eligibility rules provide a means to an end and serve as a threshold of standards by
which the governing organizations can achieve the desired goals of safety and fair-
ness." Id. "Eligibility requirements can be waived while continuing to preserve the
purposes of the safety and fairness requirements." Id.; see also Kristin Larochelle,
Note, Maintaining Athletics as an Important Part of a High School Education: The Sev-
enth Circuit Gives Hope to Disabled Student-Athletes in Washington v. Indiana High
School Athletic Association, Inc., 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 301, 355-60 (2000)
(analyzing holding of Washington case).
71. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
72. See id. at 1037 (finding waiver of age requirement would not be reasona-
ble modification under Title II of ADA). For a discussion of a successful challenge
to a similar age requirement, see supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
73. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1028 (noting both plaintiffs were two years behind
students of their age group).
74. See id. (discussing MHSAA's age limit on athletic eligibility).
75. See id. at 1029 (noting other claims raised by plaintiffs in lawsuit).
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cluding these students from participation in sports solely by reason
of disability.76 Additionally, the court held that waiver of this age
limit would fundamentally alter the sports program. 77 Therefore,
the court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on
their discrimination claims under the ADA. 78
C. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin
The above cases exemplify the role the ADA played in litiga-
tion concerning high school and collegiate athletics previous to the
landmark decision of PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin in 2001. 79 In that
case, the Supreme Court effectively held that the ADA required the
PGA Tour to allow Casey Martin to use a golf cart during its tourna-
ments and qualifying rounds ("Q-school").80
Casey Martin is a talented golfer suffering from a degenerative
circulatory disorder, Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, which
obstructs the backflow of blood from Martin's right leg to his
76. See id. at 1031. The court held that "plaintiffs' respective learning disabil-
ity [did] not prevent the two students from meeting the age requirement; the pas-
sage of time [did]." Id. at 1033. "[T]he plaintiffs [could not] meet the age
requirement solely by reason of their dates of birth, not solely by reason of disabil-
ity." Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Larochelle, supra note 70, at 309
(discussing exclusion "solely by disability" requirement in context of Rehabilitation
Act, though requirement is same under Title II of ADA).
77. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035. The court explained its holding by saying:
Due to the usual ages of first-year high school students, high school sports
programs generally involve competitors between fourteen and eighteen
years of age. Removing the age restriction injects into competition stu-
dents older than the vast majority of other students, and . . .older stu-
dents are generally more physically mature than younger students.
Expanding the sports program to include older students works a funda-
mental alteration.
Id. The court also held that waiver of the age limit would place an undue burden
on coaches and physicians to determine on an individual basis whether a student
over the age of nineteen truly had a competitive advantage that would fundamen-
tally alter the program. See id.; Cook, supra note 26, at 249 (explaining Sandison
holding that waiver would require coaches to make unfairness determination re-
garding athletes); see also Frye v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 95-1266, 1997
WL 441805, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 1997) (holding McPherson v. Mich. High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n dispositive); McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d
453, 462 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding Sandison holding dispositive in instant case). The
Sixth Circuit in McPherson found that a waiver of an eight-semester rule would be a
fundamental alteration of a high school sports program. See id. at 462. For a dis-
cussion of a case holding that waiver of the eight-semester rule was not a funda-
mental alteration of a sports program, see supra notes 60-70 and accompanying
text.
78. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035 (upholding age limit on athletic eligibility).
79. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
80. See id. at 690. For an explanation of Q-school, see supra note 9.
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heart.81 When Martin became a professional golfer and entered
the PGA Tour's Q-school, he was presented with a specific set of
rules that applied only to the Q-school.8 2 These rules ("Conditions
of Competition and Local Rules," also known as "hard card") per-
mitted use of golf carts during the first two of the qualifying rounds,
but required walking the third.83 Martin requested a waiver of the
"walking rule" for the third round of Q-school because of his de-
generative condition, but the PGA Tour subsequently denied it.8 4
Consequently, Martin filed suit against the PGA Tour for disallow-
ing him use of a golf cart, alleging violation of the ADA.85
The district court found that allowing Martin to use a golf cart
would be a reasonable modification. 86 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
this holding, declaring that allowing Martin the use of a golf cart
would not fundamentally alter the game of golf.8 7 After hearing
the case to resolve the conflict between the Ninth and Seventh Cir-
cuits, the Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit.88
81. See id. at 668. The disease is progressive and causes severe pain in Martin's
right leg. See id. Toward the end of Martin's college career, he became unable to
walk an entire eighteen-hole golf course due to the pain. See id. Walking long
distances produced a "significant risk of hemorrhaging, developing blood clots,
and fracturing his tibia so badly that an amputation [may] be required." Id.
82. See id. at 669.
83. See id. at 666-67. The "hard card" for the PGA Tour and the Nike Tour
requires golfers to walk the course during tournaments, but not during open quali-
fying rounds, which are held one week before each tournament. See id.
84. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 669. Martin provided medical records along with
his request for waiver of the walking rule. See id. The PGA Tour declined to look
at the medical records in its denial of a waiver for Martin. See id.
85. See id. Martin sued under Title III of the ADA. See id. at 676.
86. See id. at 690. The district court stated, "it would not fundamentally alter
the nature of the PGA Tour's game to accommodate [Martin] with a cart." Martin
v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1252 (D. Or. 1998); see also Cook, supra note
26, at 263 (discussing reasoning behind district court holding). "[T]he court ex-
plained that when the severity of Martin's disability is taken into consideration,
walking any amount of distance, even from a cart to a ball, causes him to endure
greater fatigue than a normal person." Id. "[T]he real fatigue that PGA golfers
battle is not walking eighteen holes, but rather the mental aspect of playing the
game of golf." Id. (citing PGA Tour, 994 F. Supp. at 1251).
87. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000). "All that
the cart does is permit Martin access to a type of competition in which he other-
wise could not engage because of his disability." Id. at 1000.
88. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 690. In Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that allowing Olinger to ride in a golf cart during the United
States Open qualifying rounds would fundamentally alter the nature of the compe-
titions, and therefore was not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. See
Olinger, 205 F.3d 1001, 1006-07 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Steven A. Holzbaur, Note,
Driving into the Rough: Conflicting Decisions on the Rights of Disabled Golfers in Martin v.
PGA Tour, Inc. and Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 46 VILL. L. REV. 171, 173
(2001) (discussing conflicting holdings in Seventh and Ninth Circuits).
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The Court stated that requiring the PGA Tour to allow Martin
to use a cart could constitute a fundamental alteration to the nature
of the tournaments and qualifying rounds in two ways.8 9 The re-
quirement would be a fundamental alteration within the meaning
of the ADA if it altered "an essential aspect of the game of golf [to
the point] that it would be unacceptable even if it affected all com-
petitors equally."90 Alternatively, a fundamental alteration could re-
sult from a "less significant change that has only a peripheral
impact on the game itself' if it gave the disabled player an advan-
tage over other competitors.9' Despite these possibilities, the Court
ruled in favor of Martin, stating, "[w]e are not persuaded that a
waiver of the walking rule for Martin would work a fundamental
alteration" in either of the aforementioned ways. 92 In addition, the
Court found that walking was not an essential aspect of the game of
golf.9 3 In response to the PGA Tour's argument that walking "in-
ject[s] the element of fatigue into the skill of shotmaking," the Su-
preme Court found that Martin suffered much more fatigue using a
golf cart than normal golfers do without such use.9 4 This rationale
also demonstrated why Martin's use of a golf cart would not give
him a competitive advantage over other golfers.9 5
Notwithstanding the administrative burden imposed by its
holding, the Court held that the ADA required an individualized
inquiry into whether a reasonable modification could be made for
89. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 682. The Court noted that Title III of the ADA
requires three inquiries: "whether the requested modification is reasonable, wheth-
er it is necessary for the disabled individual, and whether it would fundamentally
alter the nature of the competition." Id. at 683 n.38 (internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis added).
90. Id. at 682. The Court provided as an example of this type of a fundamen-
tal alteration the changing of the diameter of the hole from three to six inches. See
id.
91. Id. at 682-83. Despite having a slight effect on the game itself, an advan-
tage given to the disabled player would change the nature of the competition it-
self. See id.
92. Id. at 683 (noting modification sought by petitioner was reasonable and
necessary).
93. See id. at 685. The Court described the essence of golf as "shot-making -
using clubs to cause a ball to progress from the teeing ground to a hole some
distance away with as few strokes as possible." Id. at 683. The walking rule was
found to be non-essential in the PGA Tour's tournaments, as they are allowed in
the first two stages of the qualifying round, and also in the Senior PGA Tour
events, which is limited to golfers over the age of fifty. See id. at 685.
94. Martin, 532 U.S. at 690. Additionally, in countering the fatigue argument
by the PGA Tour, the Court proposed, "golf is a low intensity activity[;] fatigue
from the game is primarily a psychological phenomenon in which stress and moti-
vation are the key ingredients." Id. at 687.
95. See id. at 690 (explaining purpose of walking rule to "subject players to
fatigue" would not be compromised by allowing Martin to use golf cart).
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each disabled athlete.9 6 In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the
administrative burden should not be dismissed as negligible.9 7
Scalia was concerned because the majority's two-part analysis was
not a part of the statute, and necessarily would require a case-by-
case inquiry.98 With respect to the second part of the test (whether
the requested modification would give the disabled athlete a com-
petitive advantage), Scalia said, "the Court guarantees that future
cases of this sort will have to be decided on the basis of individual-
ized factual findings."9 9 Scalia predicted that as a result, cases simi-
lar to Martin's "will be numerous, and a rich source of lucrative
litigation." 100 Furthermore, Scalia criticized the first part of the ma-
jority's test, claiming it inappropriate for the Supreme Court to de-
cide what is and what is not essential to the game of golf.10 1 In
96. See id. at 690-91. The Court related that:
Congress intended that an entity like the PGA not only give individual-
ized attention to the handful of requests that it might receive from tal-
ented but disabled athletes for a modification or waiver of the rule to
allow them access to the competition, but also carefully weigh the pur-
pose, as well as the letter, of the rule before determining that no accom-
modation would be tolerable.
Id.
97. See id. at 702-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing ramifications of major-
ity opinion).
98. See id. at 699-703. For a discussion on the two-part test announced by the
majority used to determine whether a modification creates a fundamental altera-
tion, see supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Scalia's
criticism of the first part of the majority's test, see infra note 101-02 and accompa-
nying text.
99. Martin, 532 U.S. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia further remarked
that the statute does not support the majority's requirement of an individualized
inquiry. See id. at 703. "The statute seeks to assure that a disabled person's disabil-
ity will not deny him equal access to .. .competitive sporting events - not that his
disability will not deny him an equal chance to win competitive sporting events." Id.
"The latter is quite impossible, since the very nature of [a] competitive sport is the
measurement, by uniform rules, of unevenly distributed excellence." Id. Scalia
predicted the majority's "even [ing] out" effect would "destroy the game." See id.
100. Id. at 702-03 (providing example of parents of little league player trying
to convince judge that son's attention deficit disorder makes it twenty-five percent
more difficult to hit pitched ball).
101. See id. at 700. Scalia refuted the first part of the majority's analysis, in-
volving the question of whether an essential aspect of the game had been altered
due to the modification. See id. He explained that it was for the PGA Tour to
decide its own rules, and in this case, the entity had decided to mandate walking as
one of the requirements of its tournaments and qualifying rounds. See id.
"[T] here is no basis on which anyone - not even the Supreme Court of the United
States - can pronounce one or another of [the rules] to be nonessential if the
rulemaker deems it to be essential." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Scalia then
assumed that it was necessary for the Court to review what was and was not essen-
tial to the game of golf. See id. He named this inquiry an "awesome responsibility."
See id. "It has been rendered the solemn duty of the Supreme Court of the United
States, laid upon it by Congress in pursuance of the Federal Government's power
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brazen fashion, the Justice declared that all rules are essentially ar-
bitrary, and that their only support is from the ruling body that has
implemented them. 10 2
D. Cases Since Martin
Since the announcement of the two-part analysis in Martin and
Justice Scalia's adamant criticism of it, there have been several cases
involving athletes' suing under the ADA. 10 3 These cases suggest
that Martin will have a litigious effect on disabled athletes, as
prophesied in Justice Scalia's dissent.'0 4
In Cruz v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n,l 05 a
nineteen-year-old special education student challenged an age limit
on athletic eligibility.' 0 6 The age limit deemed students ineligible
to participate in sports if they reached the age of nineteen before
July 1st of the school year for which they sought eligibility.10 7 Luis
Cruz was a learning disabled, special education student and was not
enrolled in a specific grade. 08 He had played several high school
sports until his high school, Ridley High, realized that he exceeded
to regulate [c]ommerce .... to decide What Is Golf" Id. (internal quotations
omitted) (emphasis added).
102. See id. at 700-01. Justice Scalia noted in a parenthetical that, "many, in-
deed, consider walking to be the central feature of the game of golf - hence Mark
Twain's classic criticism of the sport: 'a good walk spoiled."' Id. at 701.
103. See Matthews v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209,
1227 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (holding modification of NCAA rules to accommodate
athlete would not have fundamentally altered NCAA's mission of promoting aca-
demic achievement of student athletes); Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
153 F. Supp. 2d 710 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding college student lacked standing to
sue for violation of ADA), affd in part, rev'd in part, 288 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2002);
Cruz v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 157 F. Supp. 2d 485 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(holding waiver of age limit for Cruz would not work fundamental alteration to
certain sports he played); Kuketz v. MDC Fitness Corp., No. CIV.A. 98-0114-A, 2001
WL 993565 (Mass. Super. Aug. 17, 2001) (finding that allowing Kuketz to play in
league under his requested conditions would fundamentally alter racketball). For
a discussion of several of these cases, see infra notes 105-27 and accompanying text.
104. For Justice Scalia's predictions of the future effect of Martin, see supra
note 100 and accompanying text.
105. 157 F. Supp. 2d 485 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
106. See id. at 488-89.
107. See id. at 488 (citing applicable PIAA rule). For a discussion on a case
involving a similar age limit on eligibility, see supra notes 49-59 and accompanying
text.
108. See Cruz, 157 F. Supp. at 488-89. Cruz was an educable mentally retarded
student who was enrolled in an individualized education program and read at a
third grade level. See id. at 489-90. He was permitted to stay in high school until
the end of June 2002, when he would be twenty-one years old. See id. at 488-89.
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the PLAA's age limit.10 9 Ridley requested a waiver of the age limit,
which PIAA unanimously rejected. 110 Cruz subsequently brought
suit against PLAA under Title II of the ADA."' The district court
found that waiver of the age limit for Cruz would not work a funda-
mental alteration to either football or track. 1 2 Moreover, the court
dismissed PIAA's concerns about the administrative burden of con-
ducting individualized inquiries for requested waivers.' 3 The court
held that PIAA must implement a process to consider Cruz's appli-
cation for waiver of the age limit to allow his participation in foot-
ball and track." 14 Most notably, the court did not require PIAA to
109. See id. at 489. Cruz played football, wrestled, and ran track. See id. at 491.
Cruz turned nineteen exactly twenty-eight days before the July 1st deadline. See id.
at 489.
110. See id. (indicating PIAA notified Ridley High School of its decision next
day).
111. See id. at 489 (stating Cruz also sought preliminary injunction to enjoin
PIAA from enforcing age limit against him).
112. See id. at 499 (noting individualized basis for inquiry of whether waiver
would be fundamental alteration). The court cited the three-part inquiry man-
dated by Title III of the ADA, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Martin. See id.
The court held the same inquiry should be applied in the instant case, despite
being brought under Title II. See id. Applying the Martin three-part inquiry, the
court found that modification of the age rule was necessary for Cruz to be able to
play football and run track, and that modification would not fundamentally alter
the nature of the competition in either of these sports. See id. These are the sec-
ond and third parts, respectively. See id. In deciding whether a modification would
be reasonable (the first part of the inquiry), the court found that it must deter-
mine whether the modification was essential to the sport. See id. The court de-
cided that a rule was essential if its waiver would fundamentally alter the nature of
the sport. See id. The waiver was held not to be a fundamental alteration of foot-
ball or track, but the court left undecided the question of whether the same could
be said of wrestling. See id. The court found that Cruz may have had a competitive
advantage in wrestling based on his outstanding dual meet record. See id. at 493.
Competitive advantage was the second factor listed in Martin, which in fact, if pre-
sent, would fundamentally alter the nature of a sport. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Mar-
tin, 532 U.S. 661, 682-83 (2001). For a further discussion of the three-part inquiry
discussed in Martin, see supra note 89. For a further discussion of the two-prong,
fundamental alteration test in Martin, see supra notes 89-91 and accompanying
text.
113. See Cruz, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 500. The court noted that consideration of
the administrative burden was a factor in deciding whether a modification would
be reasonable within the meaning of Title II. See id. at 499. PIAA complained of
the hardship of having to access individually whether granting a waiver would fun-
damentally alter the nature of the sport. See id. It was argued that the inquiry
would involve "complex fact-finding as well as extremely difficult judgments." Id.
The court rejected these contentions and pointed to several other waiver systems
that PIAA had in place, namely transfer and eight-semester rule waivers. See id. at
500. Additionally, the court stated, "[t]he statistics to date suggest that there may
not be many occasions for the age waiver to be requested." Id. The court con-
cluded by finding that the waiver process would not place an undue burden on
PIAA. See id.
114. See id. at 500 (stating age limit could not be applied to Cruz without
individualized inquiry).
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permit Cruz to participate in the athletic season; instead, it man-
dated an individual inquiry of Cruz's waiver applications. 115
In contrast, in Kuketz v. MDC Fitness Corporation,' 1 6 a state court
rejected a similar challenge under Title III by a racquetball player
in a wheelchair.' 17 Stephen Kuketz, a paraplegic, was a nationally
ranked wheelchair racquetball player.'18 He joined Brockton Ath-
letic Club ("Club") and subsequently requested to play in the Men's
"A" Level Tournament League.' 19 He asserted that he should be
allowed two bounces to hit the ball, as opposed to one bounce al-
lowed footed players. 12 The Club disallowed him to play in the
league, suggesting that he play in a novice league with footed play-
ers, or that the Club would set up a wheelchair league for him and
others who were interested. 121 Kuketz refused to accept these sub-
stitutes and filed suit under Title III of the ADA, alleging his re-
quest would not fundamentally alter the nature of the sport.' 22
The Massachusetts Superior Court found that allowing Kuketz
to play in the league under his requested conditions would work a
fundamental alteration to the nature of racquetball competition. 23
In applying the Martin two-prong test for determining fundamental
alterations, the court found that hitting the ball before the second
bounce was essential to racquetball. 24 Furthermore, the court
stated that a two-bounce allowance might give Kuketz a competitive
115. See id. It was ordered that PIAA must not apply the age limit to Cruz,
unless decided through a waiver rule that allows for individual consideration of his
waiver applications. See id. Furthermore, the court found that if Cruz's application
was not considered on an individual basis, he would automatically be eligible for
the upcoming school year. See id. at 500-01.
116. No. CIV.A. 98-0114-A, 2001 WL 993565 (Mass. Super. Aug. 17, 2001).
117. See id. at *4 (holding two bounces for wheelchair racquetball player
would constitute fundamental alteration of competition).
118. See id. at *1. Kuketz had been in a wheelchair since 1991. See id. He
became a nationally ranked player in 1995 after winning a sufficient number of
tournaments. See id.
119. See id. (indicating "A" League was competition among Club's finest
footed racquetball players).
120. See id.
121. See Kuketz, 2001 WL 993565, at *1 (stating manager of Club told Kuketz
she would set up wheelchair league if he could find other wheelchair players to
play in league).
122. See id. (alleging in complaint Club discriminated against him because of
his disability). The court explained that Kuketz was in effect making two requests:
"(1) he need [ed] to play in a wheelchair, rather than on foot; and (2) he need [ed]
to be given two bounces rather than one." Id. at *2.
123. See id. at *3. The court compared the use of a golf cart by Casey Martin,
which was not a fundamental alteration, to that of a wheelchair player being al-
lowed two bounces in racquetball. See id.
124. See id. The court explained that while the essence of golf was hitting the
ball, the essence of racquetball was hitting a moving ball before the second
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advantage over the footed players. 125 Interestingly, the court de-
scribed what the world would be like if it interpreted the ADA as
Kuketz requested.' 26 This slippery slope argument envisioning all
the changes that could occur in the sporting world under the ADA
is reminiscent of Scalia's dissenting opinion addressing the far-
reaching effects of cases like Martin.127
III. ANALYSIS
A. Will the Decision in Martin Change the
Face of Sports As We Know It?
1. Changing The Rules
Justice Scalia harshly criticized the two-prong, fundamental al-
teration test announced by the Martin majority. 28 With respect to
the first prong (whether the modification would alter an essential
aspect of the sport), Scalia was vehement in his opposition to judi-
cial discretion in determining what is essential to sports. 129 All
rules were arbitrary, according to Scalia, and it was for the entity to
decide its rules.130 Scalia went so far as to exude sarcasm, saying
bounce. See id. Hence, allowing two bounces would fundamentally alter the essen-
tial nature of the game. See id.
125. See id. "It is impossible to determine whether the second bounce exactly
offsets [the] disadvantage [of being in a wheelchair] or leaves [Kuketz] with a
slight advantage." Id.
126. See Kuketz, 2001 WL 993565, at *4 (discussing changes that would be
mandated in baseball, golf, and basketball). "The law permits leagues and clubs to
organize baseball, golf and basketball leagues that play their respective games in
accordance with the game's official rules without running afoul of the ADA." Id.
127. See id.; John W. Parry, Supreme Court Rules in Martin, Penry, and Buckhan-
non Cases, 25 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 517, 517 (2001). "The two
[Martin] dissenters [Scalia and Thomas], however, took the chicken little ap-
proach ... predicting the metaphorical end of civilization. As in Animal Farm...
society will be forced to retrofit all activities and functions to guarantee that 'no
one's lack of ability... will be a handicap."' Id. (quoting Scalia's dissent in Martin,
532 U.S. 661, 705 (2001) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Andrew I. War-
den, Comment, Driving the Green: The Impact of PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin on Disabled
Athletes and the Future of Competitive Sports, 80 N.C. L. REv. 643, 646 (2002) (stating
"critics have opined that the sky is falling because Martin represents the end of
equality and uniformity in sports" (internal quotations omitted)).
128. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 699-703 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
129. See id. at 700. Scalia discussed how there is no requirement for the PGA
Tour to play a "classic, essential" form of golf. See id. at 699. It was free to make up
its own rules based on how it decided the game should be played. See id. at 699-
700. "If members of the public do not like the ... rules - if they feel that these
rules do not truly test the individual's skill at real golf they can withdraw their
patronage." Id. at 700 (internal quotations omitted).
130. See id. (noting "the rules are the rules" and it was for rulemaker to decide
them based on what it determined essential); see also Parent, supra note 23, at 140
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that the Supreme Court had been presented with the "awesome re-
sponsibility" of deciding "What Is Golf."''1 1 Scalia dispensed with
this notion by calling it "unprincipled" and therefore unhelpful
and non-dispositive to future cases. 132
Regarding the second prong of the test (whether the modifica-
tion would give a specific athlete a competitive advantage), Scalia
believed it necessarily would require every case to become an "indi-
vidualized inquiry."133 Most likely, making individualized determi-
nations as to each disabled athlete would result in individualized
exceptions to all rules of competitive sports.134 Furthermore, this
step would create the appearance that the ADA required disabled
individuals to be given an "equal chance to win competitive sport-
ing events," rather than the true requirement of "equal access" to
these events. 135 Yet, competitive sports are supposed to measure
the "unevenly distributed excellence" of athletes.136 The evening-
out of this natural distribution through the grant of reasonable
modifications would result in the destruction of the entire concept
(arguing deference should be given to employer, membership organization, or
professional body in their determinations of standards and rules since they are
experts in their particular fields, and know necessary standards required for suc-
cessful completion of event or job).
131. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia regarded the
case as presenting the "age-old jurisprudential question, for which ... years of
study in the law have so well prepared [the Justices]: Is someone riding around a
golf course from shot to shot really a golfer?" Id.
132. See id. at 702. For a further discussion of the first prong of the majority's
test, see supra notes 90, 101-02 and accompanying text.
133. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling second prong
"most expansive and destructive feature" of majority opinion). For a further dis-
cussion of the second prong of the maiority's test and Scalia's criticism of this
prong, see supra notes 91, 99-100 and accompanying text.
134. See Warden, supra note 127, at 686 (denoting individualized exceptions
to rules provokes most common criticism of Martin decision); see also Kelly Collier
Cleland, Sports and the ADA After PGA Tour v. Martin, 89 ILL. B.J. 480, 484 (2001)
(discussing how courts will have to decide where to draw line on reasonable modi-
fications and how varied competitive rules will be modified).
135. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating statute requires
only equal access to play in sports); see also Parent, supra note 23, at 143 (discussing
decision of Magistrate Judge Coffin, Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242
(D. Or. 1998)). "Coffin's holdings in Martin have helped water down the intent of
the ADA, which was to ensure that disabled Americans receive basic opportuni-
ties." Id. Being able to pursue the game of golf recreationally or professionally is
something that certainly should be guaranteed to everyone. See id. In reality,
though, playing on the PGA Tour is a privilege, and should be given only to those
who can meet its qualifications. See id.
136. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining how
"handicaps" used in social games of golf, which even out varying abilities, are not
used in professional golf).
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of competitive games. 137 Tim Finchem, the PGA Tour Commis-
sioner agreed, stating, "[w]hen you change the rule for one player
in an athletic sport, you are inherently changing the landscape of
that sport.11 3 8 Thus, Scalia predicted, the doomsday of sports is
upon us now that courts are equipped with the power to equalize
competition between the non-disabled and disabled athletes.1 3 9
In Kuketz, the court also found that exceptions and alterations
to the Official Rules of Racquetball would be fundamental. 140 The
ADA did not require the court to depart from the Official Rules to
permit a wheelchair racquetball player two bounces because to do
so would alter the nature of the racquetball competition.1 4 1 The
Club in that case offered to establish a separate league with a two-
bounce rule, but the court concluded that the ADA did not man-
date that either. 14 2 The court forecasted how various sports would
be modified forever if the ADA required, according to Kuketz's in-
terpretation, alteration of competitive rules whenever a disabled
athlete wished to participate. 143 For example, "[i]n baseball, if a
hitter in a wheelchair came to a plate, the ADA would require first
base to be moved closer to home plate so that the hitter could
137. See id. (noting judicial evening-out of God-given gifts was not intent of
Congress). Decisions like Martin "distort the competition" in such a way that peo-
ple who were previously deemed unqualified are now able to participate. See Par-
ent, supra note 23, at 145. Thus the standards that once defined the game itself are
compromised as to certain disabled individuals. See id.
138. Parent, supra note 23, at 142 (quoting Tim Finchem from remarks made
at press conference). Finchem further stated, "[i]f there is anything fundamental
about athletic sport it is that you have the same rules for all competitors." Id.
139. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia stated that the
majority essentially held that "fairness and the ADA mean that everyone gets to
play by individualized rules which will assure that no one's lack of ability will be a
handicap." Id.
140. See Kuketz v. MDC Fitness Corp., No. CIV.A. 98-0114-A, 2001 WL 993565,
at *3 (Mass. Super. Aug. 17, 2001). The Official Rules of Racquetball were modi-
fied to include separate rules for wheelchair racquetball. See id. These rules were
meant to apply only where all players were in wheelchairs. See id. Thus, allowing
two bounces for wheelchair players, while other players were on foot, would work a
variation to the Official Rules. See id.
141. See id. For a further discussion of Kuketz, see supra notes 117-27 and ac-
companying text.
142. See Kuketz, 2001 WL 993565, at *3 (stating club is free to establish wheel-
chair racquetball league but not required to do so under ADA). The court stated,
"[i]t may be terrific for leagues and clubs to provide these opportunities so that
wheelchair players can compete meaningfully against footed players, but the ADA
does not require them to depart from the official rules whenever a wheelchair
player or team wants to play a footed player." Id. at *4.
143. See id. at *4 (providing examples of different alterations that would be
required in baseball, golf, and basketball).
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reach first base in roughly the time it would take a footed player to
run ninety feet."' 44
Nevertheless, counterarguments exist against the "slippery-
slope" predictions of colossal change to sports resulting from ADA
claims. 145 Scalia's argument has been termed the "chicken little"
approach because he predicted that the sky would fall after the Su-
preme Court's decision in Martin.'46 Yet, proponents of the Martin
decision have found sufficient guidance within the standards pro-
vided by the majority opinion to curtail large amounts of litigation
and resulting changes to sports rules.147 The fundamental altera-
tion standard is extolled as limiting judicial changes to only those
rules that are non-essential and therefore peripheral, and also to
modifications that will not alter the nature of the competition. 148
Additionally, the Supreme Court required an inquiry into the pur-
pose of the rule at issue to determine whether it would be compro-
mised by granting the modification. 149 Supporters of Martin have
labeled these standards as striking the correct balance between ade-
quate consideration of accommodations for the disabled and main-
tenance of the integrity of competitive athletics. 50
144. Id. (noting law allows organizations to play respective games in accor-
dance with that game's official rules).
145. See Roy R. Galewski, Note, The Casey Martin and Ford Olinger Cases: The
Supreme Court Takes a Swing at ADA Uncertainty, 21 PACE L. REV. 411, 412-13 (2001)
(discussing arguments for and against use of golf carts in tournaments). The slip-
pery slope argument suggests that Martin has opened a "Pandora's Box with far-
reaching effects." See id.; see also Rothstein, supra note 5, at 433. "[T]hose who
suggest ... that the decision in the Martin case portends tremendous change in
American sports, are mistaken." Id. For a discussion of these counterarguments,
see infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
146. See Warden, supra note 127, at 646 (noting "Chicken Littles" have opined
that Martin represents end of equality and uniformity in sports).
147. See id. at 647. By requiring an individualized inquiry in each case, the
Martin decision ensures qualified disabled individuals will have the opportunity to
partake in competitive sports, while limiting the chance that rules will become a
"collection of individualized exceptions." See id.; see also Cleland, supra note 134, at
484 (discussing how Martin standard strikes appropriate balance between "compe-
tition's goal of equality and fair play with the athlete's desire to fully participate").
148. See Cleland, supra note 134, at 483. The requisite reasonableness of the
modification combined with the necessity of finding that the modification will not
work a fundamental alteration sufficiently curtails a court's changing the rules of
competition. See id.
149. See Warden, supra note 127, at 688-90 (noting court's finding that Mar-
tin's fatigue outweighed that of competitors justified waiver because purpose of
walking rule, to maintain fatigue as part of golf, would not be compromised).
150. See id. at 688-91 (describing standards as "set of strict criteria" that are
consistent with ADA). "[T]he [Supreme] Court ... crafted an analytical frame-
work that will ensure the integrity of competitive sports for years to come." Id. at
691.
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Conversely, those that disagree with the Martin decision criti-
cize this standard precisely because it does not provide sufficient
limitation on judicial change. 151 Specifically, these critics disagree
that walking is a non-essential element of golf, and furthermore,
find that use of a golf cart during PGA tournaments will alter com-
pletely the nature of those competitions. 152 What these counter-
arguments also ignore is that the Supreme Court's two-prong,
fundamental alteration test still mandates a case-by-case inquiry.15 3
Therefore, as the judicial system must decide piecemeal which rules
as applied to individual disabled plaintiffs will work a fundamental
alteration, the result will be a mere collection of scattered rules ap-
plied to the non-disabled and their exceptions as applied to some,
but not all the disabled. 54 Moreover, a modification to an athletic
rule almost always will frustrate its purpose, so as to render this al-
legedly limiting standard equally toothless. 155
2. Is the "Individualized Inquiry" Called for in Martin Truly an
"Undue Burden" That Opened the Floodgates to Increased
Litigation?
The majority in Martin admitted that its opinion might place
an administrative burden on those subject to the ADA due to the
individualized inquiry imposed.1 56 Nonetheless, the majority reas-
151. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating it was impossi-
ble to find any of game's arbitrary rules to be essential and that essential prong of
majority's test was "unprincipled"); see also Kuketz v. MDC Fitness Corp., No.
CIV.A. 98-0114-A, 2001 WL 993565, at *3 (Mass. Super. Aug. 17, 2001) (finding it
impossible to determine whether requested modification would exactly offset disa-
bility so that athlete was not given competitive advantage under second part of
Martin fundamental alteration test).
152. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 670 (citing testimony from several of greatest golf-
ers in history). Arnold Palmer, Jack Nicklaus, and Ken Venturi all testified that
they believed use of a golf cart in PGA Tour and Nike Tour events would funda-
mentally alter the nature of those competitions. See id. at 670-71.
153. See id. at 688. The majority stated, "an individualized inquiry must be
made to determine whether a specific modification for a particular person's disa-
bility would be reasonable under the circumstances as well as necessary for that
person, and yet at the same time not work a fundamental alteration." Id.
154. See Cleland, supra note 134, at 484 (stating courts will be presented with
more requests for modifications as result of Martin). The courts will be forced to
make individualized inquiries into these claims and draw lines for each individual
plaintiff on what will and will not work as a fundamental alteration. See id. But see
Warden, supra note 127, at 687 (stating only tangential rules will be subject to
alteration, with foundational rules left untouched).
155. See Warden, supra note 127, at 689 (discussing how future plaintiffs will
have difficulty proving purpose of rule not frustrated by requested modification).
156. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 690 (stating this administrative burden could be
avoided by implementing general rules). In contrast, general policies applied uni-
formly would have the effect of discriminating against the disabled, which is pre-
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sured that the ADA required individualized considerations of the
requested modification and the underlying purpose of the chal-
lenged rule. 157 Tangentially, the Court noted that this burden was
by no means substantial because evidence demonstrated that only
Casey Martin and two other golfers had challenged the walking rule
in the three years previous to the Court's decision. 58 In Cruz, the
court dismissed an argument that administration for waiver re-
quests made by student athletes would be an undue burden. 59 The
PLAA argued that a process to evaluate waivers would entail "com-
plex fact-finding as well as extremely difficult judgments.' ' 60 It was
concluded that PIAA had waiver processes for other rules, which
exemplified the entity's ability to make these difficult decisions. 161
Furthermore, in accord with the Martin majority, the district court
found that recent statistics show that PIAA would be presented with
few requests for waiver; thus, review of these requests would not
create an unreasonable administrative burden.1 62
On the contrary, the national attention devoted to the Martin
decision may very well amplify the number of waiver requests that
are made by athletes. 163 This will undoubtedly increase the admin-
istrative burden placed on these organizations in considering each
of these requests on an individualized basis. 164 Additionally, it is
indeed difficult to decide whether a rule is essential or whether a
cisely what the ADA was meant to combat. See id. For a further discussion on the
purposes of the ADA, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
157. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 690-91 (discussing congressional intent in enact-
ing ADA).
158. See id. at 690 n.53.
159. See Cruz v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 157 F. Supp. 2d 485, 500
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (stating waiver process would not cause unreasonable burden).
For a further discussion of this case, see supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
160. Cruz, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 499 (arguing judgments as to "leadership skills,
motivational abilities, physical maturity, benefits of experience, quickness, agility,
strength, and sport-specific abilities" are very difficult to measure).
161. See id. at 500 (noting PIAA's apparent ability to consider transfer and
eight-term waivers suggests that age waiver process would not be unduly
burdensome).
162. See id. (citing findings of fact that PIAA received approximately two to
three waiver requests annually for past twenty years); see also Milani, supra note 57,
at 885-86 (indicating district and appellate courts should find that individual analy-
sis will not be undue burden).
163. See Cleland, supra note 134, at 484 (asserting slippery-slope argument is
tempting whenever decision like Martin is made).
164. See McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 462
(6th Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit determined that the plaintiff's request of waiver
processes for all those learning disabled students remaining in school for more
than eight semesters "would have the potential of opening the floodgates for waiv-
ers." Id. Increasing the number of waiver requests and subsequent reviews of
them would "increase the cost of making assessments as well as increase the impor-
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particular athlete will gain a competitive advantage through the
granting of a modification. 165 As some of these challenges will end
up in the court system inevitably, the Martin decision may well have
opened the floodgates to increased litigation over what constitutes
a fundamental alteration.' 66
B. Drug Tests, Signing Bonuses, and Terry Glenn
In addition to the potential increased litigation over funda-
mental alterations, Martin may have paved the way for ADA claims
with insincere motives. Terry Glenn sued the NFL in a Manhattan
federal district court in January 2002, claiming discrimination
based on his disability of chronic depression in violation of the
ADA.1 67 Glenn was suspended for four games after missing a drug
test in accordance with the NFL's substance abuse policy.1 68 He
claimed that his disability caused him to be unable to comply with
tance of doing so correctly." Id. For a further discussion of the eight-semester
rule, see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
165. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 700-01 (2001) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (finding it unfeasible to determine if rules are essential because all rules
are arbitrary); see also McPherson, 119 F.3d at 462 (holding requirements of waiver
process would be "immense financial and administrative burden" on MHSAA and
would force it to make "near impossible determinations" about athlete); Sandison
v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995) (calling
determination of whether athlete possesses unfair competitive advantage "daunt-
ing task"); Kuketz v. MDC Fitness Corp., No. CIV.A. 98-0114-A, 2001 WL 993565, at
*3 (Mass. Super. Aug. 17, 2001) (finding it nearly impossible to know when modifi-
cation would create competitive advantage because one could never determine
whether modification would offset exactly disadvantaging effects of disability); Cle-
land, supra note 134, at 484 (discussing how critics of Martin decision find that
"requiring professional sports organizations or administrators or coaches at the
high school or college level to make such determinations imposes an administra-
tive hardship").
166. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating majority opin-
ion guarantees future cases like Martin will have to be decided on individualized
fact findings, resulting in numerous future cases that will be source of "lucrative
litigation"); see also Parent, supra note 23, at 143 (stating Magistrate Coffin's deci-
sion for Martin at district court level "opened the door to future claims by athletes
who feel restricted by their physical or mental limitations"); Warden, supra note
127, at 688 (describing Martin holding as "guarantee[ ] that disabled athletes seek-
ing modifications ... will have their cases decided by courts"). See generally Alison
M. Barnes, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Aging Athlete After Casey Martin,
12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 67, 69-70 (2001) (discussing theory that as baby-boomer
generation gets older, litigation under ADA will increase as they seek to hold their
position in mainstream and will use Martin decision as arguing ground to obtain
reasonable accommodations).
167. See Cafardo, supra note 15, at ElI (noting Glenn's suit was brought curi-
ously during week before Patriots were to perform in Super Bowl).
168. See id. (noting Glenn's four-game suspension at beginning of football
season).
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the NFL's policy.169 While the argument may be valid, commenta-
tors have opined that Glenn sued the NFL in order to obtain the
eleven million dollar signing bonus the NFL withheld from him for
violation of the substance abuse policy.' 70 Cases like Glenn's could
push the Martin door open further for athletes who want to resist
being suspended. 17' There is substantial motivation to fight for
eleven million dollars, and using an ADA suit for leverage to regain
this money is certainly a "very dangerous precedent."'172
IV. IMPACT
A. In the Wake of Martin
Since the Martin decision, it has become clear that entities
must decide whether and to what extent their rules and policies
must be altered to accommodate the disabled to satisfy the Martin
standards. 73 For example, ClubCorp, which operates over two
hundred golf courses, country clubs, and private business clubs and
resorts around the world, released guidelines for the general golf
industry to follow to comply with the ADA.174 The guidelines sug-
gest changes with respect to planning and design of golf courses,
safety, access to facilities, and playability of the course itself.17 5 In
addition, Martin has affected not only athletic organizations, but
also employers and public entities that are subject to ADA regula-
tion, albeit under different titles of the ADA than that applied in
Martin.'76 The Supreme Court decision exemplifies a lack of defer-
ence for the employer's decisions on rules and policies that even
169. See id. (discussing how Glenn alleged chronic depression "prevented him
from following the league's substance abuse policy").
170. See Football; Glenn Is All Wrong; He Must Play to Expect Pay, BOSTON HERALD,
Nov. 30, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3818006 (stating Glenn's problems with Patri-
ots management is matter of money).
171. See Jerry Magee, Patriots' Glenn Could Go to Court to Blame Depression for
Behavior, S.D. TRIB., Dec. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 27303807 (noting jury find-
ing for Glenn could cause other players faced with suspension to argue that they
also suffer from mental disability).
172. See id. (quotingJames Godes, associate of San Diego law firm Foley and
Lardner). Godes stated that many players will argue similarly to Glenn to avoid
taking drug tests or facing the consequences of failed tests. See id.
173. See Galewski, supra note 145, at 438 (stating Martin decision has "done
more than [just] create uproar in sports world").
174. See Golf Guidelines, PARAPLEGIA NEWS, Nov. 1, 2001, at 41 (announcing
ClubCorp's release of guidelines to assist golf industry in compliance with ADA).
175. See id. (noting various changes proposed in guidelines).
176. See Littler Mendelson, Fare! Golf Case Has ADA Implications for Others, 11
No. 10 MD. EMP'. L. LETTER, July 2001, at 4. Although the Supreme Court found
that Title I did not apply to Martin, the Court's discussion on fundamental altera-
tions will prove useful to employers with respect to what future courts may find to
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indiscriminately affect disabled employees. 177 Thus, employers
must revise their rules and employee policies to ensure compliance
with ADA and the Martin standards. 178
B. Justice Scalia's Prophecy May Be Correct
At the very least, the Martin decision has elucidated that the
ADA is applicable to all sports in some way.' 79 Yet, the case may
have much broader implications for the future of athletic rules as
well as the docket caseload for the judicial system.' 80 At this point,
we may wonder whether the sports of today will be a mere twinkling
of a memory tomorrow. Perhaps the prophecy of Justice Scalia will
be realized, but the true answer to the question lies in the future.181
One aspect that does seem clear at the present moment is that the
Martin decision has made it very possible for the image of golfers
walking the green of an eighteen-hole golf course to become a twin-
kling memory in all of our minds much sooner than we think.
Amy M. Kearney
be essential functions of jobs or whether accommodations will alter a particular
job. See id.
177. See id. (warning employers should beware of adverse publicity received by
PGA Tour as result of Martin case).
178. See id. (listing steps employers should take in wake of Martin to insulate
themselves against future litigation); see also PARRY, supra note 4, at 56-64 (discuss-
ing ways employers can change different aspects of employment to comply with
ADA with respect to persons with mental disabilities); Hypes, supra note 59, at 14
(giving risk management tips to entities subject to ADA regulation to avoid
litigation).
179. See Cook, supra note 26, at 263 (describing immediate effect of Martin to
elevate awareness of ADA's reach).
180. For a further discussion of the projected impact of the Martin decision,
see supra notes 128-78 and accompanying text.
181. See generally PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 699-705 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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